Defaulting on a mortgage is widely viewed as being immoral, but no prior study has examined the intervening roles of Prospect Theory and default intent. We find that the public is significantly more accepting of a defaulting borrower who earns a zero or negative return on his investment than one who earns a positive return. This moral viewpoint changes significantly when the default is strategic in nature. Defaulters are judged significantly less harshly by those who more so blame the lender for the current financial crisis, those who have previously strategically defaulted, and males. When asked to suggest a "morally appropriate" settlement offer to lenders to resolve the distressed debt, beyond the prospect theory and default intent remaining significant, we further find that those who more so blame the lender, those who view their home as more of an investment rather than a consumption good, those who have previously strategically defaulted, those with lower income levels, and minorities suggest significantly lower settlement offers.
Introduction
Strategic mortgage default is defined as the unwillingness to continue making mortgage payments even though the borrower has the financial means available. This differs from an economic default in which the borrower is simply unable to afford to continue making mortgage payments. Pundits estimate that the percentage of all mortgage defaults that are strategic in nature range from 10%~26% (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2013; FICO, 2011; and Wyman, 2010) , a sizable portion of the mortgage market. While impossible to measure with certainty, the occurrence of strategic mortgage default is widely viewed as a major economic contributor to the prolonged economic recovery process that continues to be a drag on the economy.
Borrowers who strategically default can expect the posturing/negotiation process to be protracted over several years and accumulate untold costs in terms of legal expenses, time, and even the creation and prolonging of chronic health problems (Engelberg and Parsons, 2014; and Seiler, 2014a) . Still, the incentive to live "rent free" in the meantime, and possibly reach a very favorable settlement 1 with an understaffed, undertrained lender legal department who is often loathe to throw good money after bad chasing down borrowers in differentially borrowerfriendly states who may or may not have the means to pay awarded deficiency claims (or who reserve the right to file bankruptcy as a last stop effort to prevent an otherwise righteous 1 Although the outcomes are quite uncertain and highly variable from case to case, many of these negotiations with the lender end in a no fault agreement where the borrower relinquishes physical possession of the property in exchange for the lender releasing the deficiency judgment. It is even commonly negotiated that no 1099 be issued to the defaulting borrower. A 1099 would represent "forgiven debt" that the borrower would then have to report as income when filing that year's taxes.
foreclosure) makes strategic mortgage default a potentially attractive put option for many borrowers to consider exercising.
The act of strategic mortgage default is widely viewed as being immoral even among those who do it (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2013; and Fannie Mae, 2010) . That 80%~90% of the public believes strategic mortgage default to be immoral tells only part of the story. Are there any mitigating factors the public would consider before judging the actions of borrowers in this highstakes gamble? In this study, we apply Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory to investigate the role of reference points in defining a morally justified mortgage default. We then differentiate defaults between those that are strategic versus economic in nature.
We find that the public does not differentially object when a defaulting borrower settles his case with the lender in a way that leaves him in the overall loss domain versus breaking-even on his investment in the home. However, when a default leads to a settlement that places the homeowner in an overall gain domain (i.e., provides a positive return on his overall investment in the home), people view the settlement as being significantly less moral. When defaults are parsed by strategic versus economic intent, the public significantly finds moral culpability with a strategically defaulting borrower. And when the strategic defaulter negotiates a settlement allowing for a positive return on his investment, the greatest level of immorality is reported. In addition to our two main treatment effects (strategic mortgage default and gain domain) being statistically significant, we further find that those who blame lenders more so than borrowers for the financial crisis, those who have strategically defaulted in the past, and males are significantly more forgiving of mortgage defaulters.
We then ask people to convey what would constitute a "morally appropriate" payoff amount to offer when settling a mortgage debt with the lender under our nine alternative treatments. We confirm our earlier finding by learning that strategic defaulters should pay the most and that, as a group, defaulters should end up in the loss domain (i.e., they should earn a negative return on their investment). In addition to our two main treatment effects once again being statistically significant, we find that those who more so blame lenders for the crisis, those who view a home as more of an investment (as opposed to a consumption good), those who have strategically defaulted in the past, those with lower incomes, and minorities all suggest significantly lower "morally appropriate" settlement offers.
Literature Review
Ruthless default, a form of strategic default where the borrower is argued to exercise his put option the moment he experiences negative equity, has been studied for years. Until recently, however, home prices fell below outstanding loan balances so seldom, that the debate was more theoretical in nature. During the financial crisis homes have fallen so far and fast that it is estimates that roughly 25% of U.S. homeowners are underwater on their mortgages (RealtyTrac 2013). Despite this fact, default rates are nowhere near 25%. As Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) and Seiler et al. (2012) explain, there are several reasons borrowers remain current on underwater mortgages 2 .
2 It is beyond the scope of the current investigation to report and elaborate on all the economic and behavioral reasons why one would or would not strategically default. For a further discussion, see Seiler (2014c) .
At the same time, Seiler (2014b) explains that the legal environment surrounding the resolution of mortgage defaults has become so convoluted, due to a myriad of fraudulent activities on the part of the lending industry, 3 that strategic mortgage defaults are actually being economically incentivized. Wheaton and Nechayev (2011) argue that strategic defaults are performing a necessary service by imposing discipline on a lending system that has run amuck. Others demonize strategic defaulters arguing that legal gamesmanship on the part of borrowers is eroding neighboring home values while footing taxpayers with the bill 4 . No matter the position taken, few would deny the importance of the strategic mortgage default issue as it relates to the recovery of our slumping economy. Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) explain that there are 41 recourse states, meaning that when a borrower defaults, the lender has the right not only to sell the property, but to recover the remaining deficiency amount by going after the borrower's personal assets. Moreover, even in states that are non-recourse, it is only purchase money mortgages where the lender cannot pursue deficiency amounts. To clarify, if a borrower in a non-recourse state refinances the loan or takes out a second lien (either through a piggyback loan at the time or origination or at a later date through a Home Equity Loan (HEL) or Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC)), the lender has full recourse rights. Ostensibly, it would then seem that very few borrowers would ever find themselves in a situation where they are incentivized to strategically default no matter how far underwater their mortgage 5 .
If lenders retain the right to recover deficiency judgments from borrowers, why would a borrower ever strategically default? As Seiler (2014b) explains, one of the best kept lending industry secrets is that lenders seldom pursue deficiency judgments. One reason is that so many lenders and their affiliated collection companies have so badly abused collection efforts that in many states, the more streamlined power-of-sale process has been replaced with a mandated, and much more protracted, judicial foreclosure process where all cases must go before a judge 6 . On a related note, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created through the DoddFrank Act, in part, to regulate the measures collection agencies can take when pursuing bad debts. Defaulting borrowers now face a more civil, and less harassing, collection process that is much easier to ignore than in recent years when an official-looking authority figure could pound on the door of a residence and shame borrowers in front of their neighbors and even threaten immediate evictions.
It is also well-documented that when a second lien is held on the property, the second lien holder holds an effective (solution) "blocking power" over the first lien holder (Agarwal et al. 2014; Been, Jackson, and Willis, 2012; Bond et al. 2012; and Lee, Mayer, and Tracy, 2012) . To explain the economics behind this rationale, we already established that strategic defaulters are substantially underwater on their property. As such, even if the property has enough equity to satisfy the first lien holder, many times the second lien holder is completely uncovered. Because they have a secondary claim on the property, there is often no money left to satisfy the second after fully satisfying the first. Still, the second lien holder has a legitimate lien on the title of the property. If they do not agree to the terms of the short sale, the first cannot get its money. Thus, by exercising their "blocking power" the second hopes to encourage the first to be willing to pay them some amount of money in exchange for allowing the sale to go through. Historically, first lien holders have been unwilling to pay much at all for fear of creating a moral hazard problem.
By way of comparison, for the same reason lenders do not like to offer attractive loan modifications (because it encourages the moral hazard problem in other borrowers who will want the same favorable treatment), first lien holders do not want to give second lien holders a large sum for fear they will create a moral hazard problem between the first and the second lien holder moving forward.
This standoff has not escaped the attention of borrowers and their attorneys who see the avoidance of this moral hazard problem (between the first and second lien holders) as creating a new moral hazard problem -the encouragement of borrowers to strategically default because their two lien holders will lengthen the settlement time while the borrower lives in the home rent free. That the borrower can live in the home rent free in the short-run still does not explain why missed payments, penalties, and interest would not remove this incentive eventually. To understand this phenomenon, we turn our focus to a discussion from the lender's perspective.
Lenders are in the business of loaning money, not holding real estate. With the unprecedented influx of modification requests and mortgage defaults, lenders have become inundated with problems they are not equipped to handle. While servicers of these loans all have workout departments and Real Estate Owned (REO) divisions, they are either undermanned or the employees are undertrained 7 . As such, distressed properties are not dealt with in a timely fashion.
Over time, legal costs mount while properties become more and more underwater, or at least remain unresolved. At some point, the lender must ask itself if it would rather seek a timely settlement or a long, protracted legal battle where judges are not always unsympathetic to the role lenders have played in creating the problem. Add to this the knowledge that if a thorough defense attorney pours through origination documents deeply enough that they will in many cases find flaws in origination paperwork that cast doubt on some detail within the loan.
Attorneys use these lender missteps to ask for discovery extensions, to use as grounds for dismissal or appeal, and so forth.
With all the delay tactics at the disposal of a clever attorney, one can quickly see how these legal cases, which on the surface appear to be easily won by the lender, can encourage lenders to settle for a fraction of the loan amount. In fact, in many cases, a defense attorney can get a settlement agreement to read that neither party is admitting fault, but are instead merely agreeing that in exchange for relinquishing physical possession of the property, the lender releases all the debt owed from the borrower 8 .
Another method used by borrowers to encourage settlement of a protracted legal dispute is to market the property for sale and bring an offer to the lender. Lenders know that distressed property sales typically sell at a substantial discount to market value (Clauretie and Daneshvary, 2011) . Borrowers also know that lenders do not like to hold REOs. Thus, the offer to purchase 7 When calling in for a modification request, borrower phone calls are often answered by a twenty year old with a nose ring and spiked hair who is only trained to collect basic financial information and hand it off to someone who may or may not know what to do with it. 8 In this no fault case, the non-issuance of a 1099 is often negotiated. This prevents the borrower from having to pay taxes on the amount of debt that was "forgiven."
the property affords the defaulting borrower substantial leverage to negotiate a favorable settlement, often times at a fraction of the unpaid balance (UPB) since the lender knows not accepting the offer may yield far less in the long-run. For example, if a loan was originated five years ago for $300,000, and two years into the loan, the borrower defaults with a UPB of $260,000, then as time passes, due to late fees, penalties, interest, and missed mortgage payments, the full "payoff amount" might be $310,367. However, while this amount may be referenced at some point in the settlement discussion, lenders typically focus on the UPB at the time of default 9 .
Experimental Design
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conceived the well-know Prospect Theory which states that losses are much more painful than gains feel good. If graphed, the distribution function could be described as being concave over the "gains domain" and convex over the loss domain, where the origin (break-even point) represents the point of inflection on this curve. Prospect Theory has been used to explain why investors hold loser stocks too long and sell winner stocks too soon (Barber and Odean, 2000) . Genesove and Mayer (2001) find the same to be true in a residential real estate setting and further support the idea of homeowner money illusion which simply means that when following the Prospect Theory, homeowners will think in terms of nominal prices instead of more relevant real prices 10 . As an example, if a buyer paid $100,000 for a home 10 years ago, and a poor market makes the price subsequently fall to $95,000, a buy who wants to sell will irrationally reject an offer for $99,000 because it represents a "loss" in his mind that he is not mentally ready to accept. The rational action would be to sell because the offer is $4,000 above fair market value. Still, the homeowner would rather wait (sometimes even many years)
for an offer price that is greater than or equal to their original purchase price of $100,000. If the market recovers to the point where in 15 years, the true market value of the home is $105,000, and the homeowner receives an offer of $101,000, Genesove and Mayer (2001) show that the buyer is more willing to accept the $101,000 because it places him in the (nominal) "gain domain."
From a rationality standpoint, we know this homeowner behavior is foolish, as it completely ignores current market conditions as well as the time value of money. But, the combining of a false reference point (the $100,000 purchase price) with Prospect Theory (the strong desire to end in the gains domain) do an excellent job of explaining buyer behavior. As such, we account for both such concepts in describing our experimental design.
We begin with the hypothesis that not everyone views the morality of mortgage default independently of the concept of Prospect Theory. That is, we argue that the public will more strongly object on moral grounds to a borrower who defaulted and made a positive return on his "investment in the home" versus a defaulting borrower who ended in the loss domain (or who broke-even). Even though both situations may represent an economic loss in real terms, we know from the extant literature that people suffer from money illusion. To this end, we are careful to write our scenarios within the experiment without reference to either real or nominal terms. With this is mind, we create three variants of the experiment. The first involves the borrower ending in the loss domain; the second reflects them breaking even on the overall investment, while the third represents them ending in the gain domain.
Then, recognizing the contentious debate surrounding the morality of strategic mortgage default, we further hypothesize that default intent matters in the mind of the public. To measure the effect of this intervening variable, we create three more experimental design variants. The first is where we provide no mention of the default intent and use this as a base-line measure of reaction. In the second, we describe a strategic default, while in the third, we describe an economic default.
Below is the exact script we use to describe the first of nine variants in our study.
"A couple bought a home a while back 11 . At some point, they stopped making their monthly mortgage payments, but remained living in the home.
Taking into consideration all the financial factors (falling home prices, missed mortgage payments, "rent-free" living, late fees and interest, and so forth) the lender proposed the couple give back the house AND pay the lender $80,000 to "equitably" settle the loan. While this amount represents a "fair settlement," offer in overall financial terms, for the couple to "break-even" on their overall investment, they would need to pay the lender only $40,000.
The couple made a counter-offer to give back the house BUT pay the lender only $60,000 to settle the loan.
Please rate the morality of the couple's counter-offer to give back the house AND pay the lender $60,000, resulting in an overall loss of -$20,000 ($40,000 -$60,000) on the investment on a scale from 1~8 (1 = immoral ~ 8 = moral)" Note that the second sentence describes the "no reason given for default" treatment. The first sentence as well as the entire second paragraph are the same for all nine variants and are written to establish what would constitute a "fair settlement" and the break-even (or reference) point for the borrower 12 . Because of the previously established irrationality of money illusion, we are intentionally vague in the wording of the scenarios (relating to the timing and amounts spent) to disallow participants the ability to attempt their own calculations. Instead, we summarize everything for them allowing for the ceteris paribus examination we seek to achieve.
For reporting purposes, the strategic default wording used in the second sentence of the scenario reads, "The couple could afford to continue making their monthly mortgage payments, but believed it was no longer in their best financial interests. At some point, they stopped making payments, but remained living in the home." The economic default scenario has the second sentence read, "After a series of financial setbacks brought on by an unexpected major illness, the couple was no longer able to continue making their monthly mortgage payments. At some point, they stopped making payments, but remained living in the home."
To differentiate the three Prospect Theory variants (loss, break-even, and gain domains), we describe the couple as making one of three different offers. We are careful to ensure the amounts are uniformly distributed about the break-even point. As previously reported, the loss domain reads:
"The couple made a counter-offer to give back the house BUT pay the lender only $60,000 to settle the loan.
Please rate the morality of the couple's counter-offer to give back the house AND pay the lender $60,000, resulting in an overall loss of -$20,000 ($40,000 -$60,000) on the investment"
The break-even treatment reads:
12 Again note that we are careful not to allow participants to go down the confusing path of nominal versus real returns.
"The couple made a counter-offer to give back the house BUT pay the lender only $40,000 to settle the loan.
Please rate the morality of the couple's counter-offer to give back the house AND pay the lender $40,000, resulting in an overall Break-Even ($40,000 -$40,000) on the investment."
The gain domain treatment reads:
"The couple made a counter-offer to give back the house BUT pay the lender only $20,000 to settle the loan.
Please rate the morality of the couple's counter-offer to give back the house AND pay the lender $20,000, resulting in an overall Gain of + $20,000 ($40,000 -$60,000) on the investment."
In the first part of the experiment, we ask participants to report their level of perceived morality person perceives himself to believe. All this is to say that our results reflect a "revealed preference" of people's view of morality, not their "stated preference" view, which can differ substantially, particularly on important, emotional issues such as morality.
We now turn our focus to asking participants what they believe to be a "morally appropriate"
offer by the couple to settle the loan. Specifically, we write:
"The lender believes $80,000 is a "fair and equity" settlement offer for both parties. Alternatively, for the couple to "break-even" on their overall investment in the home, they would need to pay the lender only $40,000.
What do you believe would be a "morally appropriate" offer for the couple to make? $ ________"
Whereas participants were previously asked to respond to a fixed scenario (a necessary structure to properly test our hypotheses), we now offer the participant a chance to answer a flexible, open-ended question. Our hypotheses remain the same in that we posit default intent and Prospect Theory matter a great deal when people suggest "morally appropriate" counter-offer amounts.
Sample
To understand the intervening roles of Prospect Theory and default intent on morality, we sought input from 2,000 homeowners from across the United States. We used an existing network of homeowners 13 who stand ready to participate in such tasks in exchange for a fee 14 . We use a between subjects design meaning that participants have no idea of our overarching research questions. Instead, they follow only one of the nine paths in our experiment.
In any experiment, it is important to ensure participants are taking the time to read the scenarios being described to them carefully, and providing answers that reflect their underlying beliefs. We establish confidence in many ways, such as by placing hidden timers on each page of the experiment. If a participant clicks an answer too quickly, we know there is no way they would have had the time to read the scenario, ponder their answer and mark their choice. Because 13 While the sample is entirely different, we pull from the same large pool of homeowners as studies by Seiler (2014e,f). 14 Since the questions we ask do not have "right" or "wrong" answers, we pay a fixed fee as opposed to other economic experiments where participants are incentivized to answer "correctly" by being awarded greater amounts with every "right" decision. This flat fee system is standard operating procedure in experimental frameworks.
reading speeds vary from person to person, we screen based on various time filters and check for robustness in the results 15 .
We also disperse two questions in the experiment that simply asks the respondent to answer, say "3" on a 9-point scale, just to make sure they are actually reading our instructions. With two of these questions on place, there is only a 1 in 81 chance the respondent is not reading our question and still randomly selected the two correct answers. Continuing, the first screen requires the respondent to indicate their state of residence by selecting from a dropdown menu. They then select their city from a second drop down menu. On one of the last pages in the experiment, we ask for their zip code. Cross referencing the authenticity of their reported zip code with their reported city, allows us another screen to verify accuracy in their reported data.
The research clearinghouse matches researchers with participants in exchange for a 10% fee 16 .
The system offers participants anonymity and thus the freedom to respond in an honest way without fear of repercussions. At the same time, researchers report back to the clearinghouse those who have not taken their task seriously (as measured by a failure to clear our various screens). Each participant is then given an "approval rating" based on past performance on other tasks. We require participants only be allowed in our study if they have a past approval rating of 95% or higher. After screening our 2,000 participants, we are left with 1,938 valid and complete responses to our experiment.
Results

15
We report the results from using five seconds as a cutoff in this study for our main treatment effect screens, but find the results are not sensitive to the timer screen. 16 The fee is paid by the researcher, not the participant.
(insert Exhibit 1 here) In the break-even domain, columns 8, 2, and 5, the mean scores are 6.09, 5.87, and 4.61, respectively. Finally, in the gain domain, mean morality scores are 5.21, 4.61, and 4.09. In all three groupings, we clearly see a consistent result that people are more morally forgiving of economic defaulters and significantly less morally forgiving of strategic defaulters.
Combining the two treatment effects yields a powerful result. Specifically, the lowest mean score across the nine treatments is associated with strategic defaulters who end in the gains domain. This is consistent with our discussion to this point that people strongly oppose defaulters ending in the gain domain, and that people view strategic mortgage default as extremely immoral. All When examining the impact of default intent, we compare column groupings: "7, 1, and 4," "8, 2, and 5," and "9, 3, and 6" just as we did in the prior exhibit. Again we observe a numerical consistency supporting the idea that default intent matters. Also consistent with our prior results is that the strategic default treatments reported in columns 4~6 are associated with the highest "morally appropriate" suggested settlement amounts. This implies that people once again do not find it acceptable to profit from a default when it is strategic in nature.
A Multivariate Analysis
When transactions data are used to answer research questions, it is understood that there are numerous explanatory variables changing simultaneously. For this reason, a multivariate technique, such as regression analysis, is used in an attempt to hold all else constant. In an experimental design, ceteris paribus is achieved on the front end of the study by isolating the variables of interest through a carefully crafted experiment.
(insert Exhibit 3 here)
This methodological difference notwithstanding, we recognize that there may be respondent characteristics that might skew personal views of default morality in one direction or another. To this end, we model people's moral views on default by consider not only our two main treatment effects, but also include a number of other independent variables. Exhibit 3 reports summary statistics for variables we consider in our multivariate regression analysis to follow.
The variable Blames the Lender is collected on a 9-point scale where 1 = the lender is more to blame for the current housing crisis, and 9 = the borrower is more to blame. This variable is also converted into a dummy variable for whether the respondent more so blames the lender (=1) as opposed to the borrower (=0) for the current housing crisis. We hypothesize participants who more so blame the lender will be more sympathetic towards a defaulting borrower since it is the lender who got them into the situation in the first place. Alternatively, those who view the borrower as being more to blame should be less forgiving of a default since it is perceived to be their fault for getting themselves into this situation.
A similar pair of variables is collected relating to whether the homeowner views his home as an investment (1 on a scale from 1 to 9) as opposed to a consumption good (9 on a scale from 1 to 9); Home as an Investment dummy =1 for more of an investment, and = 0 for more of a consumption good. While not as important in the first regression where the dependent variable is the morality of default, we hypothesize that in our second regression where the dependent variable is the proposed "morally appropriate" settlement amount, people who view their home as more of an investment will suggest a lower settlement payoff in an attempt to preserve the return on the investment.
Previous Default =1 if the respondent previously defaulted on a mortgage, and 0 otherwise. Of those who have defaulted, respondents self-select into either an Economic Default or a Strategic Default. We hypothesis that those who have previously defaulted, particularly if that default was strategic in nature, will be far more understanding of defaulters in general and will therefore suggest a lower settlement payoff amount.
In the first regression where we model the morality of default, we include a series of respondent demographic data as more of an exploratory exercise rather than based on a series of hypotheses. Model II reports the inclusion of the remaining independent variables. As hypothesized, those who more so blame the lender for the financial crisis make significantly lower settlement offers.
Moreover, those who view their home as more an investment (as opposed to a consumption good) also make significantly lower settlement offers supporting the notion that by doing so they hope to preserve as great a portion of their return on investment as possible.
Continuing, those who have strategically defaulted on a mortgage in the past offer significantly lower settlements than those who have not 19 . Concerning respondent demographic characteristics, minorities make significantly lower settlement offers, while those with greater incomes make significantly higher settlement offers.
Conclusions
It is well-documented that the public views mortgage default as generally immoral. But no prior study has delved deeper into the analysis to examine if there are additional intervening factors that further explain moral viewpoints. In the current investigation, we consider the role of both Prospect Theory and default intent in gaining a deeper understanding of this complex issue. We find that the public is significantly more accepting of a defaulter who ends in the loss domain or the break-even domain (i.e., who earns a zero or negative return on his home investment) than a borrower who defaults and earns a positive return on his investment (ending in the gains domain).
Concerning default intent, strategic defaulters are consistently and significantly viewed as having acted immorally when compared to an economic defaulter, who by definition had no choice but to default on his mortgage due to a liquidity constraint. When respondents were asked to suggest a "morally appropriate" settlement offer to satisfy the loan with the lender, both the Prospect Theory and default intent remained significant intervening effects.
In additional to the two main treatment effects, those who more so blame the lender as opposed to borrowers for the current financial crisis viewed mortgage default as less immoral as did those who had strategically defaulted in the past and males. When explaining "morally appropriate" settlement offers suggested by the public, we find that those who more so blame the lender, those who view their home as more of an investment, those who have previously strategically defaulted, minorities, and those with lower incomes significantly suggest lower settlement offers.
Exhibit 1. Morality of Mortgage Default by Default Intent and Domain
This exhibit reports the frequency of morality scores as well as several measures of central tendency (mean, median, mode, and standard deviation) under nine different treatments (a 3 x 3 experimental design). No Reason Given does not share the reason the couple defaulted on the mortgage. Strategic Default shares that the couple can afford to make their payments, but has stopped making monthly mortgage payments because they believe it is no longer in their best financial interests. Economic Default shares that after a series of financial setbacks brought on by an unexpected major illness, this couple is no longer able, and has thus stopped making their monthly mortgage payments. Loss Domain refers to the couple making a settlement counter-offer of $60,000 which leaves them with an overall loss on their investment. Break Even refers to the couple making a settlement counter-offer of $40,000 which leaves them with an overall break-even position on their investment. Gain Domain refers to the couple making a settlement counter-offer of $20,000 which leaves them with an overall gain on their investment. Strategic Default shares that the couple can afford to make their payments, but has stopped making monthly mortgage payments because they believe it is no longer in their best financial interests. Economic Default shares that after a series of financial setbacks brought on by an unexpected major illness, this couple is no longer able, and has thus stopped making their monthly mortgage payments. Loss Domain refers to the couple making a settlement counter-offer of $60,000 which leaves them with an overall loss on their investment. Break Even refers to the couple making a settlement counter-offer of $40,000 which leaves them with an overall break-even position on their investment. Gain Domain refers to the couple making a settlement counter-offer of $20,000 which leaves them with an overall gain on their investment. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% $49,318 $47,023 $43,764 $54,873 $49,966 $47,031 $48,102 $46,888 $38,491 $47 ,243 Median $50,000 $40,000 $40,000 $60,000 $50,000 $40,000 $50,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000
Mean
Exhibit 3. Univariate Summary Statistics
This exhibit reports univariate summary statistics for variables considered in the regression analysis. Behavioral Characteristics include the following. Blames the Lender is measured on both a 9-point scale (where 1 = the lender is more to blame for the current housing crisis, and 9 = the borrower is more to blame); This variable is also converted into a dummy variable for whether the respondent more so blames the lender (=1) as opposed to the borrower (=0) for the current housing crisis; A similar pair of variables is collected relating to whether the homeowner views his home as an investment (1 on a scale from 1 to 9) as opposed to a consumption good (9 on a scale from 1 to 9); Home as an Investment dummy =1 for more of an investment, and = 0 for more of a consumption good. This exhibit reports the results from three regressions where the dependent variable is the deemed "morally appropriate" counter-offer (which ranges from $0 ~ $80,000). The Treatment Variables section includes two variables. Strategic Mortgage Default represents the first treatment where 1 = the couple was reported to have strategically defaulted on their mortgage; 0 = otherwise. Gain Domain refers to the couple making a settlement counter-offer of $20,000 which leaves them with an overall gain on their investment. The Behavioral Characteristics section includes three variables. Blames the Lender is measured as a dummy variable where 1 = the respondent more so blames the lender, 0 otherwise; Home as an Investment =1 when the homeowner views his home as more of an investment, and = 0 when it is viewed as more of a consumption good. Past Strategic Default = 1 if the respondent has defaulted on a mortgage in the past. Demographic includes seven variables. Male Dummy = 1 for men, 0 otherwise; Child Dummy = 1 if the respondent has at least one dependent child living at home, 0 = otherwise. Minority Dummy = 1 if the respondent is not Caucasian, 0 otherwise; Married Dummy 1 = married, 0 otherwise; Income on a scale from 1 = under $20,000, to 7 = over $120,000; and Region. Midwest = 1 for Midwest, 0 otherwise; Northeast = 1 for Northeast, 0 otherwise; 
